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Erratum
Page 398, footnote, 5, Costa v. Cox should be omitted and the note should begin: "In this case the termination
of the business may have been the reason for bringing suit...."
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the insured, as required by the policy in order for insured's liability
to attach. The plaintiff recovered below and on appeal this judg-
ment was affirmed." The court found that the question of co-opera-
tion, or lack thereof, on the part of Cox was properly for the jury,
and discussed the failure of the insured to take further steps to find
Cox. Judge Taft, dissenting,6 stressed the fact that the suit was
against Cox, not Howe, and that the evidence as to Cox's behavior
was completely the opposite of the "co-operation" which was a con-
dition precedent to plaintiff's right to recover. Taft further stated
that the evidence failed to establish permission by Howe to use the
automobile at the time of the accident, which would also relieve the
insurer of liability.
EDGAR I. KING
LABOR LAW
RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE
A number of Ohio cases were reported in the past year, dealing
with the rights of an individual workman, both in relation to his em-
ployer and his union. This is an area of growing interest in the field
of labor-management relations, and a rather natural subject of con-
cern at this stage of development. Unions have achieved a much
more secure position than they enjoyed twenty years ago, and are
fairly well established in most of the larger industries in this state.
The place of the individual in this scheme of things, therefore, ap-
pears to warrant greater attention. Some of the recent Ohio deci-
sions may have considerable future significance.
In Wesley v. Electric Auto-Lite Company,' an action was brought
by an employee seeking damages for time lost as a result of a layoff
claimed to have been in violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the employer and the union. The court held, first, that
the plaintiff was a third party beneficiary under the agreement, and
as such was entitled to maintain the action. It was further held that
the seniority provisions of such an agreement give rise to a property
right which will be protected by the courts. Judgment was rendered
for the plaintiff employee in the amount of $145.88, a sum equivalent
to the pay which plaintiff would have received for seven consecutive
Fridays if he had been retained in accordance with the applicable
seniority provision. This is a highly significant determination, and
furnishes a useful avenue of approach for an aggrieved employee who
does not choose to utilize the grievance procedure afforded by the
agreement.2
5. Costa v. Cox, 168 Ohio St. 379, 155 N.E.2d 54 (1958).
6. Id. at 384, 155 N.E.2d at 58 (dissenting opinion).
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The court's holding on the seniority question may also be of in-
terest to those in the field of labor-management relations. The col-
lective bargaining agreement provided that when it became necessary
to reduce the working force of a department, layoffs would be made
according to seniority, in order to provide a normal eight-hour day
and forty-hour week for employees in the polishing and buffing de-
partments. The plaintiff was a senior employee and would have
worked full time under this provision, but the employer unilaterally
decided to cut all employees to a thirty-two hour week in order to
avoid any layoffs. The court in effect held that this situation in-
volved a reduction of the working force, within the meaning of the
contract provision, and further held that the management preroga-
tive clause could not be relied upon to alter or to modify an express
provision found elsewhere in the agreement.-
The court was also called upon to construe the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement in International Union v. L. T. Patterson
Company,' although in this case the union joined with the individual
plaintiffs in bringing suit. This was an action to recover vacation
pay under an agreement providing for vacations with pay for em-
ployees (including employees laid off but still carried as employees)
who "prior to June first of the current year" have the specified
length of continuous service. Where the employer ceased business
operations altogether on March fifth of the year in question, it was
held that the employees were not entitled to vacation pay, since the
1. 159 N.E.2d 912 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
2. To an arbitrator, there is an immediate question as to the reason for not filing a grievance
and, if necessary, submitting the matter to arbitration. The opinion throws no light upon
this point, since there is no reference to a grievance or the arbitration thereof. Every collec-
tive bargaining agreement worthy of the name contains some reference to the handling of
grievances and usually provides for arbitration as the last step of the grievance procedure, so
it is not likely that the answer lies in a complete omission of such a provision in this par-
ticular agreement. Neither is it likely that an adverse decision had been rendered by an
arbitrator, since an arbitrator's decision is considered final and binding upon the parties, there
being no appeal therefrom under ordinary circumstances. It could be that the union declined
to approve or process this particular grievance, but even this is subject to doubt since the
Local involved, unlike other Locals of the same International Union, had refused to accept
any deviation from the seniority provision as requested by the employer pursuant to an express
provision for exceptions included in the agreement. It is clear that a grievance existed, even
under the most limited definition, since the issue involved an interpretation of the express
terms of the applicable agreement. The absence of any reference thereto may indicate a con-
clusion that the principle of exhaustion of internal remedies is not applicable in this situation.
This would seem to be a proper determination in any event, since court consideration of the
issue might not otherwise be available under ordinary circumstances. The availability of the
courts in a case of this kind may be particularly valuable to an employee for whom the union
has declined to file or process a grievance, although a wide acceptance of this method might
add an unwelcome burden to already overcrowded dockets.
3. The latter ruling is certainly in accord with sound rules of construction, and is the view
adopted by most arbitrators. As the court pointed out, the language of the seniority require-
ment in relation to layoffs was unambiguous and unequivocal, and the application thereof
could not be made to depend upon business conditions or the amount of sales.
4. 159 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio C.P. 1956), af'd, 159 NX.2d 917 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956), appeal
dismissed, 166 Ohio St. 148, 140 N.X.2d 318 (1957).
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employment relationship had been terminated prior to the date the
vacations presumably were to commence. The court reasoned that
the employees, although having the required length of service, should
not have the right to paid vacations after the business had ceased and
the employment relationship had been terminated, unless the agree-
ment specifically so provided.5
In Petty v. Dayton Musicians' Association,6 the action was
brought by a former agent or personal representative of various mu-
sicians, most of whom were members of the union, seeking damages
allegedly caused by the union's publication of a notice to its members
not to negotiate contracts through the plaintiff. He was not a mem-
ber of the union, but was referred to as a sub-booking agent. The
court held that a party who is not a member of the union, but is
merely licensed or approved by it as an agent for its members, has no
cause of action against the union unless it is alleged that the union's
action was in violation of his contract, was factually unlawful in some
other manner, or violated rights conferred upon him in some way by
the union's constitution or rules.7
The protection afforded a union member by a court of equity,
both as to his right to membership and to hold office, is illustrated by
the decision in Local 118 v. Utility Worker's Union.8 It was there
held that the action of the executive board of a national union, oust-
ing the officers of a local union for refusal to honor a picket line es-
tablished in contravention of a no-strike clause in the existing contract
between the union and the employer, was unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive. The court vacated the suspension of these officers from
membership and ordered their reinstatement into office. In addition,
the national union was restrained from seizing any books, property,
5. Costa v. Cox, 168 Ohio St. 379, 155 N.E.2d 54 (1958).
in the court instead of resorting to the grievance procedure, although it is entirely possible
that the latter could have been used in conjunction with the winding up process. Since the
decision obviously would not serve as a precedent for these parties in the future, the cost of a
private arbitrator may have been an additional factor in this instance. Interestingly enough,
the court considered itself bound by the provision, contained in many collective bargaining
agreements, that "the arbitrator shall not have the power to add to or subtract from or modify
any of the terms of this agreement." This language was construed as an expression of inten-
tion "that the contract is complete in itself and must be so recognized and respected by all."
Id. at 927.
6. 153 N.E.2d 218 (Ohio C.P.), aff'd, 153 N.E.2d 223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
7. The decision is clearly distinguishable on its facts from the supreme court's decision in
Perko v. Local 207, Internat'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 168
Ohio St. 161, 151 N.E.2d 742 (1958), discussed in Teple, Labor Law, Survey of Ohio Laws
- 1958, 10 WEST. REs. L. Rnv. 421 (1959). In the Perko case there was an allegation of
interference with the plaintiff's contract of employment, he had been a member of the union,
and much more drastic measures had been taken. Judgment was rendered on the pleadings
in the instant case, and the court simply found that the petition failed to state facts sufficient
to give rise to a cause of action either on the theory of libel or of an interference with the
plaintiff's right to labor or contract.
8. 162 N.E.2d 524 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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or assets of the Local, and from interfering with the internal affairs
thereof.0
At the same time, it was held in another case'0 that the Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen was not subject to mandamus to require
the holding of a convention in accordance with the union's constitu-
tion. The constitution required the holding of a convention for the
election of officers and the transaction of other business every four
years. The court said that this requirement could not be postponed
by a referendum vote of the majority of membership, but held that
since there is no law specifically enjoining the Brotherhood to call its
convention, mandamus was not the proper remedy. 1
INADEQUACY OF REMEDY AT LAW
Sanders v. Yogenitz involved the issuance of a mandatory in-
junction to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. The defendant
was a member of the union and the proprietor of a barbershop in
which he himself worked and employed another barber. He signed
an agreement with the barbers' union, but subsequently refused to
display the union shop card or pay his contributions to the union wel-
fare fund as required by the agreement. No picketing was under-
taken nor boycott attempted. Instead, the union's business agent
brought this action on behalf of the Local and its members, to compel
performance of the agreement. Since no adequate remedy at law
appeared to be available, the court held that this was a proper
remedy. Damages, it was said, would not adequately compensate for
the defendant's violation of the contract terms; only equity, through
the process of the mandatory injunction, could secure for the union
membership all of the benefits for which the parties had contracted.
The inadequacy of the remedy at law in a case of this kind is well
illustrated by the result in Aeronca Independent Union v. Aderonca
Manufacturing Corporation,3 wherein the plaintiff was held to be
entitled to recover nominal damages in the total sum of one dollar,
plus costs. This was an action by the union against the employer for
9. The court reasoned that the constitution of the national union, as interpreted by its presi-
dent and executive board (so as to authorize breach of a no-picketing pledge), contravened
the law of Ohio, and that the plaintiffs were therefore justified in bringing their action in,a
court of equity. On the issue of exhaustion of internal remedies, the court concluded that
appeal to the convention of the national union, as prescribed in its constitution, would have
been futile. No reluctance to interfere is apparent from the opinion.
10. State ex rel. Titler v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 160 N.E.2d 321 (Ohio Ct. App.
1959). See also discussion in Civil Procedure section, p. 352 supra.
11. The court referred to general authority indicating that ordinarily mandamus will not lie
to regulate the internal affairs of unincorporated associations, and a holding that it is not a
proper means of requiring the secretary of a corporation to call a stockholders' meeting. The
court does not suggest what other remedy might be available, but Title I of the Federal Report-
ing and Disclosures Act of 1959, enacted after this case was decided, may afford one answer.
12. 161 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 169 Ohio St. 233, 158 N.E.2d 896
(1959).
13. 153 N.E.2d 718 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
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breach of the collective bargaining agreement by failure to deduct un-
ion dues from the employees' paychecks as agreed. The court ruled
that the plaintiff, an unincorporated association, had no entity sepa-
rate and distinct from its individual members, and since the defendant
had paid the employee-members all of the wages due, the injury which
the plaintiff had sustained when the defendant breached the agree-
ment was a legal injury, without damage. No special damages had
been shown.'4 This result may be compared with that obtained in
Sanford v. Boston Edison Company, 5 where it was held that an as-
signment provision in a collective bargaining agreement for the col-
lection of dues from the employees' wages could be enforced in an
action for specific performance.
FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
In Oliver v. 4ll States Freight, Incorporated,"6 it was held that
a provision in a collective bargaining agreement between the union
and the employer fixing the price to be charged for the use and su-
pervision of trucks and trailers used in the trucking business, where
such equipment was owned by individuals who leased it to the car-
riers, was not within the scope of the Federal Labor Management Re-
lations Act'1 so as to preclude the jurisdiction of a state court under
the pre-emption doctrine. The court also held that the agreement
was in violation of the Ohio statute prohibiting monopoly and re-
straint of trade,'8 and, therefore, warranted an injunction to prevent
its performance. This determination was finally reversed, however,
by the United States Supreme Court,'9 which held that the matter was
within the general subject of wages, hours and other conditions of
employment, for which collective bargaining is required by the terms
of section 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, and which is
protected by section 7 thereof. There was no room, the Court said,
14. Defendant's refusal to deduct dues occurred on July 1, 1957, and the following January
six hundred and forty-five employees delivered written revocations of the authorizations to
make deductions. The court held that this amounted to ratification of the employer's action.
The court also decided, however, that the failure of union officials to file non-communist
affidavits and financial statements, as then required by the Federal Taft-Hartley Act to gain
a place on a representation election ballot, was not such a breach of the agreement as to pre-
clude recovery thereunder, on the strength of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956). The court further held that the
action could be maintained in the state court, since the subject matter was not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, citing the Perko case, 168 Ohio St. 161, 151 NE.2d 742
(1958). See note 7 supra.
15. 316 Mass. 631, 56 N.E.2d 1 (1944), referred to with particular emphasis in Sanders v.
Vogenitz, 161 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
16. 156 NE.2d 176 (Ohio C.P. 1956), aff'd, 156 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957),
appeal dismissed, 167 Ohio St. 299, 147 N.E.2d 856 (1958).
17. Ch. 120, 61 Star. 136-58 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-68, 171-82,
185-87 (1958).
18. OHIo REv. CODE § 1331.01(A), (B) (1)-(5).
19. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
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for the application of state policy respecting monopoly which limited
the solutions which the parties themselves could provide through
agreements collectively bargained.20
LIMITATIONS ON PICKETING
Four decisions reported last year concerned the control of picket-
ing. In Richman Brothers Company v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers,2 1 the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the de-
cision of the court of appeals reported in the 1957 Survey. 2 It was
held that where interstate commerce is involved, non-violent stranger
picketing to induce unionization is governed exclusively by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,23 and the state courts lack the power and
jurisdiction to intervene.- Although it was recognized that "stranger
picketing" is contrary to the existing public policy of the state, 25 it
was decided that this policy cannot apply where interstate commerce
is involved.
The situation has changed somewhat, of course, as a result of the
enactment of the Federal Reporting and Disclosures Act of 1959,26
which places additional federal restrictions on certain types of picket-
ing, and permits the states to act in situations where the NLRB has
declined to do so.
20. In the words of the court, the interference of state law in this manner "would frustrate
the parties' solution of a problem which Congress has required them to negotiate in good faith
toward solving, and in the solution of which it imposed no limitations relevant here." Id.
at 296. The recognition of the problem created by the use of the sub-contracting device, and
the legitimate effort to meet it through collective bargaining, is much more apparent at the
federal than at the state level. The threat of disruption of the bargaining process at the state
level seems more immediate than the potential danger to matters of legitimate state concern,
and the broad language of the federal court's opinion will undoubtedly yield to future state
requirements which overbalance federal policy in this field of law. For a detailed discussion
and a critical analysis of the United States Supreme Court's opinion, however, see Cox, Major
Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1958, 1959 PRocEDINGS OF TBE A.B.A. Section of
Labor Relations Law, p. 23, 25-31.
21. 168 Ohio St. 560, 157 N.B.2d 101 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 838 (1959).
22. See discussion in Teple, Labor Law, Survey of Ohio Law - 1958, 9 WEST. RES. L. REV.
338 (1958).
23. Ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1947), as amended, 61 Stat. 136,
29 U.S.C. S *141 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
24. The lower court's order had enjoined activity construed as mass picketing and interfer-
ence with access to plaintiff's stores, but had declined to ban all picketing. Not satisfied,
Richman sought review on motion to certify the record. In the supreme court, three justices
dissented from the conclusion of the majority, although they did not make dear how the de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court should be distinguished or the doctrine of pre-
emption avoided. Richman Bros. Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 168 Ohio St. 560,
565, 157 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1959). The majority opinion by Judge Zimmerman relied
heavily upon Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) and Hotel Employees Union v. Sax
Enterprises, Inc., 358 U.S. 270 (1959), although expressing uncharacteristic irritation with
the growing centralization of powers in the federal government.
25. Citing Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N.E.2d 934 (1940) and Chucales v. Roy-
alty, 164 Ohio St. 214, 129 N.E.2d 823 (1955), in both of which Judge Zimmerman dis-
sented.
26. 73 Star. 519 (1959).
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In Faxon Hills Construction Company v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners,17 the court held that the evidence sustained
a finding that a labor dispute did not exist between the employer and
its employees when the Union commenced picketing early in October
1955, and that in any event, after the employer had arranged to have
all its work done by subcontractors the following Spring, no labor dis-
pute existed between the employer and the Union, notwithstanding
the fact that the subcontractors may have been using non-union em-
ployees. The picketing, the court concluded, was for recognition pur-
poses only.
The Union had demanded recognition as the bargaining repre-
sentative, claiming it represented a majority of the employees. Some
cards were offered in evidence indicating membership in the Union,
but all of them, except one, were signed prior to the date when the
picketing began, at which time, according to the evidence, not a single
employee wanted to be represented by the Union. The employer sug-
gested that an election be held by the NLRB to determine the ques-
tion of representation, but neither party chose to file such a request
with the NLRB, and no unfair practice charges were filed. The ma-
jority opinion relied upon Crosby v. Rath and Chucales v. Royalty.28
The injunction was granted.
Ballas Egg Products Company v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,29
also involved an action by the employer for injunctive relief against
organizational picketing at the employer's plant. The court recog-
nized that peaceful picketing of a business engaged in interstate com-
merce is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government,
even though it is conducted by "strangers," but held that the state
court retained the power to enjoin mass picketing, threats of physical
injury or property damage to employees desiring to work, obstruction
of entrances to the place of work or streets and public roads adjacent
thereto, and picketing of the homes of employees. The court limited
the Union to two pickets at any one time, requiring said pickets to
walk from opposite ends of the sidewalk in front of the employer's
27. 162 N.E.2d 161 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958), appeal dismissed 168 Ohio St. 497, 156 N.E.2d
321 (1959). In the decision herein discussed, the court of appeals was considering the matter
on remand from the Ohio Supreme Court (168 Ohio St. 8, 151 N.E.2d 12 (1958)). For a
discussion of the supreme court's decision, see Teple, Labor Law, Sarvey of Ohio Law - 1958,
10 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 421, 424 (1959).
28. See note 25 supra. In the Faxon Hills case, Judge Matthews dissented, expressing the
opinion that the situation existing when the case was first considered, had not actually changed.
The court had originally found that a bona fide dispute between plaintiff and its employees
existed at the time the picket line was established by the employees. He was further of the
opinion that the resort to the strategy of substituting independent contractors for the employees
did not transform a lawful strike into an unlawful one. The employees involved were car-
penters. Faxon Hills Const. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 162 N.E. 2d 161,
163 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958) (dissenting opinion).
29. 160 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
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